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orate, is not as strong as that in other North Carolina cases, the jury
commissioners are seemingly traveling a path that is perilously close to
the danger area.
G. L. GRANTHAM, JR.
Criminal Law-Receiving Stolen Goods-Elements in the Crime
In State v. Yow, 1 the defendant was indicted for larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods. The state's evidence tended to show the following:
Prosecuting witness had a pistol stolen from a locked compartment in
his car parked in front of the defendant's sandwich shop. Immediately
previous to the theft, the prosecuting witness had shown the defendant
the pistol, and had thereafter absented himself from his car for a period
of not more than five minutes, during which time the pistol was stolen.
Defendant denied all knowledge of the crime, and promised to aid in
returning the stolen article. Two months later, officers with a search
warrant entered the defendant's home and asked defendant's wife the
location of the pistol. She directed them to a dresser where it was
found unconcealed in the top drawer. The defendant's motion for a non-
suit was denied. The jury acquitted the defendant upon the charge of
larceny, but found him guilty of .receiving stolen goods. On appeal,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the conviction and held
the non-suit should have been allowed, among other grounds, for in-
sufficient evidence that the defendant received the goods, or if he did,
that he received them with a felonious intent.
It is necessary in order to convict an accused of receiving stolen
goods that the state prove the property was received, that at the time
of receipt it was stolen property, that the receiver knew the property
was stolen, and that his intent in receiving it was felonious.
2
It must be shown that, in fact and in law, the property was stolen
at the time of receipt by the accused.3 If the goods were not stolen,
or were stolen but have since come back into the possession of the
1227 N. C. 585, 42 S. E. 2d 661 (1947). Jiustice Barnhill dissenting without
opinion.
IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §14-71: Receiving stolen goods: If any person shall
receive any chattel, property, money, valuable security or other things whatso-
ever, the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, either at
common law or by virtue of any statute made or hereafter to be made, such
person knowing the same to have been feloniously stolen or taken, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be indicted and convicted, whether the felon
stealing and taking such chattels, property, money, valuable security or other
thing, shall or shall not have been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be
amenable to justice; and any such receiver may be dealt with, indicted, tried and
punished in any county in which he shall have, or shall have had, any such prop-
erty in his possession or in any county in which the thief may be tried, in the
same manner as such receiver may be dealt with, indicted, tried and punished in
the county where he actually received such chattel, money, security, or other
thing; and such receiver shall be punished as one convicted of larceny.
' State v. Shoaf.-68 N. C. 375 (1873).
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owner or his authorized agent, the. defendant does not commit the crime
by receiving them, even though he may believe the property to be
stolen. 4 For this reason, neither. the owner nor the law enforcing offi-
cers may use previously stolen goods for the.purpose of entrapping the
defendant.5 Likewise, the receiver is not guilty of receiving stolen goods
if the original taking of the property was without felonious intent.8
At common law and by the express terms of the statute in this state,
it is necessary that the receiver shall know that the property has been
stolen at the moment he receives it;7 Guilty knowledge may be inferred
from the circumstances of receipt, but it must be established that the
defendant was possessed of either actual or implied knowledge. In
North Carolina guilty knowledge may not be proved by showing that
a reasonably .prudent man would have known the goods received were
stolen, for the test in this jurisdiction is the knowledge of the defendant
alone,s though in many jurisdictions the reasonably prudent man rule
is applied.0 Guilty knowledge may be inferred when the accused pur-
chased the goods at a price considerably less than their value,' 0 or
when other stolen property has been found in his possession." Proof
that he has altered the character of the goods received,' 2 or that he has
committed other similar criminal acts's may also tend to establish the
requisite guilty knowledge. Proof that the accused subscribed to a news-
paper which carried an account of the robbery of goods later found in
his possession was held sufficient to establish scienter.
14
The goods must be received into the possession of the defendant,
but this receipt may be either actual or constructive.' 5 And when the
goods are found in the exclusive dwelling house of the defendant,. this
is evidence to be considered by the jury that they have been received.'8
Sufficient evidence of possession and receipt will be proved if it be shown
that the goods were received by the defendant's agent or servant, or at
his instigation were deposited by the thief in some place directed by
'See Notes, 66 A. L. R. 506 (1930) ; 86 A. L. R. 272 (1933).
United States v. De Bare, 6 Biss. 358, Fed. Cas. No. 14,935.
'Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47 (1873) ; State v. Shoaf, 68 N. C. 375
(1873).7 State v. Barbee, 197 N. C. 248, 148 S. E. 249 (1929) ; State v. Caveness, 78
N. C. 484 (1878).
8 State v. Miller, 212 N. C. 361, 193 S. E. 388 (1937) ; State v. Stathos, 208
X. C. 456, 181 S. E. 273 (1935) ; State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562
(1935).
" State v. Gordon, 105 Minn. 217, 15 Ann. Cas. 899 (1908).10 State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
" Ibid.; State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881).
" State v. Brown, 198 N. C. 41, 150 S. E. 635 (1929).20 State v. Dail, 191 N. C. 231, 131 S. E. 573 (1926); State v. Stancil, 178
N. C. 683, 100 S. E. 241 (1919) ; State v. Murphy, 84 N. C. 742 (1881).
14 State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
' State v. Johnson, 60 N. C. 236 (1864).
'eIbid.; see State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222, 226 (1877).
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him.17 If the defendant recei'ved the goods from an innocent agent of
the thief, or if he received them from another who previously received
the goods from the thief, under such circumstances that the first receiver
was guilty of the offence, the defendant in this state and by the better
view is guilty of receiving stolen goods.18 It is generally held that the
wife does not commit the offence by receiving from her husband; but
he is not so favored when he receives stolen goods from her.19
Another element which must be proved in the crime of receiving
stolen goods is that the defendant received the stolen property with a
felonious intent,20 and the case will be reversed on appeal if the judge's
instructions fail properly to submit this issue to the jury. It is suffi-
cient to prove the defendant intended to aid the thief, but proof that
the defendant intended to benefit personally by receiving the goods is
not essential.21  If the defendant receives the goods intending to hold
them for reward,22 or to use them in the commigsion of another crime,23
his intent is felonious. Evidence of felonious intent may be found
where the defendant first denies possession of goods later found in his
possession,24 or when he attempts to disguise the goods by changing
their character, 25 or when he is charged with a crime and remains silent
though at liberty to speak.26  Where the defendant was in possession
of stolen goods, and not only failed to explain the possession, but
made contradictory statements concerning how he acquired them,
our court held it was within the province df the jury to determine his
intent.27  However, felonious intent may not be proved from mere
recent possession of stolen goods, as the presumption of guilt arising
from unexplained recent possession, without more, does not extend to
the statutory crime of receiving stolen goods.28  In this state the pre-
sumption arising from recent possession applies only to the offence of
larceny, and therefore, when an indictment charges in one count larceny,
and in the other receiving stolen goods, if the instructions to the jury
17 State v. Weinstein, 224 N. C. 645, 31 S. E.. 2d 920 (1944) ; State v. Stroud,
95 N. C. 626 (1886).
"'MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW, 398 (1934); State v. Cannon, 218 N. C. 466, 11
S. E. 2d 301 (1940) (where defendant received from a forner guilty receivetQ.
CLARIX AND MARSHALL, CaIums, 509 (3rd ed. 1927) ; see, State v. Wilson,
176 N. C. 751, 97 S. E. 496 (1918).
o State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Caveness,
78 N. C. 484 (1878).
21 State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Rushing,
69 N. C. 29, 12 Am. Rep. 641 (1873).2
" Arcia v. State, 26 Tex. App. 193, 9 S. W. 685 (1888).
'3 State v. Dail, 191 N. C. 234, 133 S. E. 574 (1925).
" Birdsong v. State, 120 Ga. 850, 48 S. E. 329 (1904). But see State v.
Oxendine, 223 N. C. 659, 27 S. E. 2d. 814 (1943).
' State v. Worthington, 64 N. C. 594 (1870).
a State v. Brown, 198 N. C. 41, 150 S. E. 635 (1929) ; State v. Dail, 191 N. C.
234, 131 S. E. 574 (1925) ; State v. Mincher, 178 N. C. 698, 100 S. E. 339 (1919).
'7 State v. Conner, 212 N. C. 668, 194 S. E. 291 (1937).
28 State v. Best, 202 N. C. 9, 161 S. E. 535 (1931).
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relate only to the presumption which may arise concerning the first
count, the defendant is entitled to a new trial should he be convicted
solely upon the count of receiving stolen goods.29 If the defendant does
not have knowledge that the goods are stolen,30 or if he receives them
for a lawful purpose such as to return them to the owner,31 he may not
be found to have a felonious intent.
In accord with the practice which is authorized by statute 2 in this
state, the defendant in the principal case was indicted on two counts,
one for larceny, and the other for receiving stolen goods. This pro-
cedure was adopted by our courts as early as 1848, 3 and soon thereafter
the first statute was enacted codifying it. 4
Under this type of indictment the court, in an early case,35 approved
a general verdict of guilty upon several counts; this verdict, of course,
did not specify upon which count the defendant was found guilty. The
court's reasoning was, that in any event, since only one sentence could
be given upon the general verdict, there could be no prejudice to the
defendant. Without modification, this is the law today.81
Both at common law and by the weight of authority, the general
rule is that when a larceny has been committed, the principal thief, that
is the one who is guilty of the actual caption and asportation, cannot
be adjudged guilty of criminally receiving, for the reason that he can-
not receive from himself.37 However, this is not the rule in North
Carolina, for a general verdict of guilty constitutes a distinct and separate
verdict of guilty upon each count,38 and therefore, in this state, a de-
fendant may be found guilty of both crimes. On appeal, the Supreme
Court will sustain the general verdict if there be sufficient evidence to
prove either one of the two counts, for the Court'apparently presumes
that the jury based their verdict upon the good count. In the principal
case the defendant was found guilty of receiving stolen goods but was
acquitted of larceny. Therefore, when the court found there was in-
sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty of receiving stolen goods,
2 State v. Lowe, 204 N. C. 572, 169 S. E. 180 (1933); State v. Adams, 133
N. C. 667, 45 S. E. 553 (1907).
" State v. Oxendine, 223 N. C. 659, 27 S. E. 2d 814 (1943) ; State v. Gaddy,
209 N. C. 34, 182 S. E. 667 (1935) ; State v. Lowe, 204 N. C. 572, 196 S. E. 180(1933).
3 State v. Morrison, 207 N. C. 804, 178 S. E. 562 (1935); State v. Caveness,
78 N. C. 484 (1878).
32 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §15-151: Larceny and receiving: ... The defend-
ant may be charged in the same indictment in several counts with the separate
offenses of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, and larceny."
23 State v. Williams, 31 N. C. 140 (1848).
N. C. REV. CODE of 1855, c. 35, §23.
" State v. Williams, 31 N. C. 140 (1848).
"6 State v. Warren, 228 N. C. 22, 44 S. E. 2d 207 (1947).
37 See Note, 136 A. L. R. 1088 (1942); State v. Worthington, 64"N. C. 594(1870).
"' State v. Cross, 106 N. C. 650, 10 S. E. 854 (1890).
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the defendant was set free. However, under the same set of facts, it
is quite possible that a conviction might have been sustained and the
defendant sent to prison had the jury returned a general verdict as is
the usual practice instead of a special verdict. For if a general verdict
had been rendered, the court would not have been limited to examining
only the evidence in the crime of receiving stolen goods, but would have
been at liberty to consider the evidence presented on the count of lar-
ceny. If the court had found sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt
of larcency, then the general verdict would have been sustained even
though the jury in fact had rendered the verdict upon the count of
receiving stolen goods. Since the crimes are mutually exclusive, it
would seem that the jury should only be allowed to render a special
verdict upon this type of indictment, and that the defendant is prejudiced
by the use of the general verdict. From the standpoint of the prosecu-
tion, the result is a desirable one, for in many cases it is extremely diffi-
cult to determine whether the defendant actually stole the goods or
merely received them.39
In the principal case,40 it is clear that two elements of the crime
were definitely proven. First, that the pistol was stolen, and secondly
that the defendant had knowledge that the pistol was stolen. There-
fore, the only other elements which the state had to prove were that
the defendant received the pistol, and that he did so with a felonious
intent. The Supreme Court apparently decided that the evidence on the
latter two points was insufficient even to go to the jury.
The exercising of any control or dominion over stolen goods is suffi-
cient to constitute receiving, and it is not necessary that there be an
actual manual possession.41 Since there can be no possession without a
previous receipt, proof of possession should be proof of receipt. In
State v. Joh=on,42 proof of possession was established when the goods
were found in the exclusive dwelling house of the defendant, and this
holding received approval in the dictum of a later case.48  Since the
principal case, the court has had before it State v. Warre;,44 in which
a general verdict of guilty of larceny and receiving stolen goods was
upheld. In this case the only evidence that the defendant received the
stolen goods was that they were found hidden in his home, yet apparently
"State v. Carter, 113 N. C. 639, 18 S. E. 517 (1893); State v. Toole, 106
N. C. 736, 11 S. E. 168 (1890); State v. Smiley, 101 N. C. 709, 7 S. E. 904(1888); cf. State v. Major, 48 S. C. L. (14 Rich.) 76 (1866); Weisberg v.
United States, 49 App. D. C. 28, 258 Fed. 284 (1919) ; Rex. v. Smith, Dears cc.
494, 196 Eng. Reprint 818 (1855).
" State v. Yow, 227 N. C. 585, 42 S. E. 2d 661 (1947).
4145 Am. JiR.: RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS, §3, p. 385.
2 60 N. C. 236 (1864).
"'See State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222, 226 (1877) ; State v. Sherman, 216 N. C.
719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1939).
"228 N. C. 22, 44 S. E. 2d 207 (1947).
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this evidence was found sufficient to prove the defendant received the
goods. Since proof of the element of receiving has seldom been ques-
tioned in this jurisdiction, the court has not had an opportunity to ex-
press itself fully upon this subject. However, in view of past decisions,
it would seem that at least in the present case, there was sufficient evi-
dence to allow the jury to determine whether the defendant had received
the goods.
There was no direct evidence in. the case that the defendant received
the stolen goods with a felonious intent. This left only the question of
whether the circumstances under which the defendant received the goods
were such that his felonious intent might be implied. Since the pre-
sumption which arises from recent possession had no application, the
jury at most was left to conjecture whether the defeidant received the
stolen goods with a felonious intent, or received them for the purpose
of returning the goods to the rightful owner as he had promised to do.
Unquestionably these circumstances alone were not sufficient to imply
that the defendant received the goods with felonious intent, for our Court
has said, "When the act of a person may be attributed to two or more
motives, the one criminal and the other not, the humanity of our law
will ascertain as to that which is not criminal." 45
Granting that in the present case there was insufficient evidence of
felonious intent, would the Supreme Court have arrived at a different
result had the state proved that the defendant had been in possession
of the gun for sufficient length of time to have returned it to the owner ?
THoMAS A. WADDEN, JR.
Damages-Decereased Purchasing Value of the Dollar
As Element-Excessiveness
A federal district court recently sustained a jury verdict awarding
$160,000 to a four-year-old boy for loss of both arms' above the wrist
and elbow respectively in a personal injury action.1 A most interesting
aspect of the case is the importance attached to the decreased. purchasing
value of the dollar by the trial judge in reviewing the award on defend-
ant's motion to set aside as excessive. 2
Although. expressed necessarily in terms of the dollar, the value of
an award of damages is not that dollar itself, but the goods and services
it will purchase. Thus fluctuations in the purchasing value of the dollar.
should be a proper consideration in the measurement of monetary yom-
, State v. Massey, 86 N. C. 658 (1882).
'Armentrant v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S. D. W. Va. 1947).
' Id. at 101 ("In seeking to discover whether or not the jury were actuated
by any improper motives in arriving at the amount of the verdict, we should
attempt to measure the monetary value of the different elements of damage which
were proper for their consideration; bearing in mind the decreased value of the
dollar, which has come about very rapidly during the past few years.').
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